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POST-RACIAL PROXIES:
RESURGENT STATE AND LOCAL ANTI-“ALIEN”
LAWS AND UNITY-REBUILDING FRAMES FOR
ANTIDISCRIMINATION VALUES
Mary D. Fan ∗

ABSTRACT
Though unauthorized migration into the United States has
diminished substantially since 2007, anti-“illegal alien” state and local
laws and furor are flaring again. While one of the biggest worries
regarding such “anti-alien” laws is the risk of racialized harm, courts
invalidating overreaching statutes are relying on structural or
procedural grounds, such as preemption and due process doctrines.
This Article examines how these political and legal trends point to how
proxies are used in a post-racial era to dance around race, in
constructive, national unity-rebuilding as well as divisive, inflammatory
ways. Anti-alien legislation is a proxy way to vent resurgent racialized
anxieties and engage in friend-enemy politics founded on conflict with
the “Other”—the foreign enemy within—in a time of economic and
political turmoil. The approach of cutting back overreaching statutes
using alternate frames of analysis, such as preemption rationales, to
vindicate prior national commitments to balancing antidiscrimination
with enforcement can be constructively deployed to fill gaps and blind
spots in antidiscrimination doctrine, and to mitigate polarization by
making shared interests and social cohesiveness rather than racial
divergence of interests salient.
Equality norms can be framed and vindicated in a more palatable,
legally tenable form, and tied to other interests to appeal more widely
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and ameliorate estrangement in a polarized polity. Legislation is
invalidated not to “accommodate” the minorities against the majority
will, but to preserve values such as the federal balance, or guard
against arbitrary governmental power. The approach is also a
technique of bridge-building across worldviews to appeal to hierarchs,
who tend to be conservative supporters of tough legislation, as well as
egalitarians, who value equality more highly. To be constructive,
however, these alternate approaches must enfold antidiscrimination
concerns and norms into the analysis rather than altogether elide the
concerns. Moreover, in crafting decisions, courts have an important
role to play in counteracting rather than amplifying the spread of
conflation and misperception that fuel fierce friend-enemy politics.
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INTRODUCTION
Anti-immigrant legislation and furor are flaring again amid
economic and political turmoil, though unauthorized migration has
diminished substantially since 2007, when the recession dampened the
draw of jobs. 1 There has been an explosion of immigration-related state
1 See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Flows are Down
Sharply Since Mid-Decade, PEW HISPANIC CTR., i, iii, 1-2 (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/126.pdf [hereinafter PEW HISPANIC CTR. 2010 REPORT]
(reporting a two-thirds decrease in inflow of unauthorized migration between 2007-2009
compared to 2000-2005). Unauthorized migration tends to ebb and flow with the ups and downs
of the economies of the United States and Mexico, where about sixty percent of undocumented
migrants originate. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN

FAN.32-3

2011]

2/16/2011 4:22:27 PM

POST-RACIAL PROXIES

907

and local legislation, with every state in regular session considering
immigration-related legislation in the first half of 2010. 2 As of the end
of June, there were 314 enacted laws and resolutions in 44 states—a
21% increase since 2009. 3 The imagery of rampant hordes of
“illegals”—now a noun in the national parlance 4 —remains the frame
through which current law is shaped and viewed, though the
unauthorized population decreased by a million between 2007 and 2009
and the flow of unauthorized immigrants is down about 70%. 5 Recent
flashpoints in the battle include Arizona’s controversial Senate Bill
1070, passed this summer and partially preliminarily enjoined three
months later, with suits pending. 6 Nearly twenty states have signaled
desire to follow Arizona’s path, though whether such political posturing
will produce law remains to be seen. 7 Other controversial proposals
circulate, such as the elimination of birthright citizenship or branding
the birth certificates of “anchor babies,” a biologistic metaphor of
anxiety over pregnant foreigners illegally entering the United States to
implant babies who become birthright citizens able to petition for more
foreign relatives to come. 8 Further fueling the fervor is the imagery of
IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 111 (2002); Jeffrey S. Passel & Roberto
Suro, Rise, Peak, and Decline: Trends in U.S. Immigration 1992-2004, PEW HISPANIC CTR., 2-3,
10-11 (Sept. 27, 2005), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/53.pdf.
2 Immigrant Policy Project, 2010 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States,
January-June
2010,
NAT’L
CONF.
ST.
LEGISLATURES
(July
20,
2010),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=20881.
3 Id.
4 See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2010), http://oed.com (defining the noun
“illegal” to mean “illegal immigrant”). The notion of “illegal” as a human identity has even
controversially seeped across borders and language into the Spanish “los ilegales.” See, e.g.,
Rafael Cardona, Opinión, Ilegales o indocumentados, LA CRÓNICA DE HOY (Mex.) (Aug. 2,
2010, 2:50 AM), http://www.cronica.com.mx/nota.php?id_nota=522908 (critiquing concept).
5 Compare PEW HISPANIC CTR. 2010 REPORT, supra note 1, at i-ii, 1 (noting the dramatic
decline in unauthorized immigration and a million less living in the U.S.), with, e.g., Russell
Pearce, Enough is Enough, http://www.russellpearce.com (follow “SB 1070” hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 8, 2010). Senator Russell Pearce, the sponsor of controversial Arizona Senate Bill
1070, explained his impetus for the bill: “We have been overrun . . . . [M]illions more will come
behind them, and we will be over run to the point that there will no longer be a United States of
America . . . . How long will it be before we will be just like Mexico?” Id.
6 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985, 987, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010).
7 Jerry Markon & Robert Barnes, Arizona Appeals Judge’s Ruling on Immigration Law,
WASH. POST, July 30, 2010, at A03; see also Michael W. Savage, Oklahoma, South Carolina and
Utah May Follow Arizona’s Lead on Immigration Law, WASH. POST, July 8, 2010, at A04
(noting that most of the proposed measures are not likely to be adopted or signed by governors
but that legislators in Oklahoma, South Carolina and Utah indicate that there is a realistic chance
of passing similar legislation when they reconvene in 2011).
8 See, e.g., Julia Preston, Citizenship as Birthright is Challenged on the Right, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 2010, at A8 (reporting on Senator Lindsey Graham’s proposal to eliminate birthright
citizenship for children of illegal immigrants because, in his words, “[w]e can’t just have people
swimming across the river having children here,” and frustration over “anchor babies”); Alia
Beard Rau, Migrant Hard-Liners’ Next Target: High Court, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 12, 2010, at
A1 (reporting on Arizona proposal to add notation to birth certificates of children of illegal
immigrants denoting this status).

FAN.32-3

908

2/16/2011 4:22:27 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

the unauthorized migrant spreading lurid violent crimes like a
contagion, particularly in border areas 9 —though crime rates in border
towns and Arizona have been flat or decreasing 10 and a new study
involving time-series analyses suggests that violent crime rates
decreased the most in cities with the greatest immigrant inflows
between 1990 and 2000. 11
While one of the biggest worries regarding such “anti-illegal” or
“anti-alien” laws is the risk of racialized harm, courts invalidating
overreaching statutes are relying on alternate frames: mainly
preemption 12 and, to a lesser extent, due process doctrines. 13 This
Article examines how these trends in our political and legal scene
illustrate how proxies are used in an avowedly “post-racial” society to
dance around race, in both destructive and potentially constructive
ways. Anti-alien legislation is a proxy way to vent resurgent racialized
anxieties and engage in friend-enemy politics founded on conflict with
the “Other”—the foreign enemy within—in a time of economic and
political turmoil. The approach of cutting back overreaching statutes
using alternate, unity-reinforcing frames of analysis to vindicate
equality values can be constructively deployed to fill gaps and blind
spots in antidiscrimination doctrine. Further, this approach can mitigate
polarization by making convergent interests and social cohesiveness,
rather than racial divergence of interests, salient. Structural, procedural,
or interpretive grounds, such as preemption and due process doctrines,
can be alternate frames for making prior national commitment to
antidiscrimination values salient. Equality norms can be framed and
9 See, e.g., Mary De Ming Fan, The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and
Heuristic Mistake, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 40-47 (2007) (examining how cascades in
mistaken perception and conflation of immigrants with crime and dangerousness are catalyzed);
Christopher Dickey, Reading, Ranting and Arithmetic, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/27/reading-ranting-and-arithmetic.html (referencing claims
of an “illegal-alien crime wave” and Arizona Governor Jan Brewer’s claim that “[w]e’ve been
inundated with criminal activity”); Francis Fukuyama, Immigrants and Crime: Time for a
Sensible Debate, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2010, at A15 (noting the “widespread perception of a
strong link between immigrants and crime”).
10 Dennis Wagner, Violence is Not Up on Arizona Border, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 2, 2010, at
A1.
11 Tim Wadsworth, Is Immigration Responsible for the Crime Drop? An Assessment of the
Influence of Immigration on Changes in Violent Crime Between 1990 and 2000, 91 SOC. SCI. Q.
531, 532-33, 548-49 (2010).
12 See Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 765-69 (10th Cir. 2010); Lozano
v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531, 2010 WL 3504538, at *32-46 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2010); United
States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 992-1006 (D. Ariz. 2010); Villas at Parkside Partners v.
City of Farmers Branch (Farmers Branch III), 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 851-59 (N.D. Tex. 2010);
Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (Farmers Branch II), 577 F. Supp. 2d 858,
866-76 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1056-57 (S.D. Cal.
2006). But see Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2008,
amended 2009) (finding no preemption of state laws criminalizing employment of undocumented
workers), cert. granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010).
13 See Farmers Branch II, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 876-77; Garrett, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1057-59.
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vindicated in a more palatable, legally tenable form, and tied to other
interests to appeal more widely and ameliorate estrangement in a
polarized polity.
The approach may also appeal internally as well as externally
within the decisionmaking process to judicial centrists who value
equality principles in light of the need to foster social cohesion and
avoid division. In an important new article analyzing the jurisprudence
of race-based remedies for inequality, Reva Siegel illuminates how
“racial moderates” on the Supreme Court adhere to an
“antibalkinization perspective” that “privileges laws that expressively
affirm universalism and commonality rather than difference and
division.” 14
This preference for approaches that ameliorate
estrangement and division may also influence the approach taken to
claims of harm posed by laws facially framed in terms of immigration
status, but that have a tense relationship with race.
The use of alternate frames that make interest convergence rather
than division salient is also a technique of bridge-building across
worldviews to appeal to hierarchs and individualists, who tend to be
conservative supporters of tough legislation, as well as egalitarians, who
value equality more highly.
Legislation is invalidated not to
“accommodate” the minorities against the majority will, but to preserve
values such as the federal balance or guard against arbitrary
governmental power.
To be constructive, however, these alternate approaches must
enfold antidiscrimination concerns and norms into the analysis rather
than altogether elide address of the concerns. Moreover, courts
adjudicating based on data and reason at an institutional remove from
the fierce political fray have an important role in providing a calming,
rational voice of authority to counteract the spread of conflation and
misperception that fuel fierce friend-enemy politics.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I contrasts the friendenemy politics and legislation of our contemporary scene with the state
and local legislation and furor against the Chinese during the turbulent
politics of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Part II analyzes the
resurgent state and local anti-“alien” laws of our times. Part III
examines how recent decisions cutting back on state and local laws
overreaching into the domain of immigration and posing the risk of
racialized harms are founded on alternate grounds to antidiscrimination.
Part III concludes by theorizing the import of these alternate frames to
make shared interests, rather than racial difference, salient and help

14 Reva Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision
in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3, 25) (on file with
Cardozo Law Review). See also infra Part III.B (situating the analysis in the literature).
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build bridges between dissonant worldviews to navigate the profoundly
polarized politics and legislation of our times.
I. FRIEND-ENEMY POLITICS
In another society under strain, riven by economic woes and fierce
doubt, Carl Schmitt argued that the fundamental distinction on which
political life rests is that of friend and enemy. 15 The enemy is “the
other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a
specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so
that in the extreme case, conflicts with him are possible.” 16 As for the
friend side of the equation, the “us” in a democratic polity, Schmitt
argued that homogeneity was crucial and necessitated—“if the need
arises—elimination or eradication of heterogeneity.” 17 He cited as
examples the expulsion of the Greeks from Turkey and the prevalence
of national laws, such as those of Australia at the time, restricting
immigrants to the “right type of settler.” 18 While homogeneity can be
defined in different ways in a pluralistic society with many faiths,
ideologies and worldviews, these examples illustrate that ethnicity was
a salient feature for Schmitt.
Contemporary morality may have parted ways with Schmitt in
some regards, 19 but his insights remain important in part because he
openly voiced a logic that flares with particular ferocity when the nation
is in the grips of economic travails and doubts. In the past and our
present, the political 20 and the polity reinvigorates in times of doubt and
turmoil through conflict with the “Other” and attempts to purge this
foreign enemy within. Dissident political groups try to rouse support
against current power holders using a rallying point of threat with an
15
16
17

CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26 (George Schwab trans., 1996).
Id. at 27.
CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 9-12 (Ellen Kennedy
trans., 1985); see also Chantal Mouffe, Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy, in
THE CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT 38, 47 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1999) (explaining that Schmitt
conceived of homogeneity as the necessary bond for a democracy and the construction of an
“us”).
18 SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 9 (quoting
HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, bk. I, ch. 3, § 6 (2d ed., Amsterdam 1631)).
19 Carl Schmitt, was, after all the “Crown Jurist of the Third Reich,” though his ideas have
transcended his history to influence poststructuralist thinkers. See JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, A
DANGEROUS MIND: CARL SCHMITT IN POST-WAR EUROPEAN THOUGHT 3, 39-51, 238-41
(2003).
20 I use the name “the political,” after Schmitt’s das politische, to convey the realm of
political life. For an interesting exegesis of the notion of “the political” and the use of the noun,
see David Ames Curtis, Translator’s Foreward to JEAN-MARC COICAUD, LEGITIMACY AND
POLITICS: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF POLITICAL RIGHT AND POLITICAL
RESPONSIBILITY, at xiii-xiv (David Ames Curtis ed. & trans., 1997).
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explicitly or implicitly racialized face. This process of pronounced
differentiation is a means through which faith and fervor in an “us” as
an identity is regenerated despite the travails of the times. 21
Those vilified and used to define the boundary between our
national “us” and the threatening “Other” have historically taken
different—generally raced—forms. Nativists of the past have vilified
the Italians, Jews, Eastern Europeans, Irish, Blacks, Japanese and
Chinese, among others. 22 Demonstrating the acutely racialized nature
of animosity, out-group Caucasians were often not perceived as white,
but as degraded “swarthy types” in the Social Darwinian scale. 23 In this
multi-textured history of animosity, the story of the intensification of
hostility and state and local laws against the Chinese in California
around the time of the severe recession of the 1870s has resonance with,
and insight for, our contemporary political and legal scene.
A.

Déjà Vu Politics

In 1878, Representative Horace Davis of California said of the
“Chinaman”:
Twenty-eight years ago the pioneer Chinaman was welcomed with
an eager curiosity, but with no foresight of the eventful consequences
of his coming. To-day, he is found in every village, in every mining
camp, utterly an alien in the body-politic, and like some foreign
substance in the human body, breeding fever and unrest till that
system is relieved of its unwelcome presence. 24

Times had been getting tougher since the boom years of the 1850s,
when the Chinese were drawn to the goldfields, swamps and mountains
21 Cf. Christian Calliess, Europe As Transnational Law—The Transnationalization of Values
by European Law, 10 GERMAN L.J. 1367, 1370 (2009). Calliess explained:
As we know from sociology and social psychology, the development of identity also
may (or possibly even has to) be linked with differentiation, namely the necessary
distinction between “Us and Them”. . . . [N]othing supports the evolution of a group
identity more effectively than a common enemy. This is exactly the kind of identity
development which appears (within the context of State theory) in Carl Schmitt’s
notorious “friend-enemy scheme.”
Id.
22 See, e.g., KAREN BRODKIN, HOW JEWS BECAME WHITE FOLKS & WHAT THAT SAYS
ABOUT RACE IN AMERICA 25-52 (2002); IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 27-28, 35-37 (2006); SALVATORE J. LAGUMINA, WOP! A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ANTI-ITALIAN DISCRIMINATION 11-15 (2d ed. 1999).
23 LAGUMINA, supra note 22, at 14-16. Italians, for example, were variously referred to as
“the Chinese of Europe,” “dagoes,” and “guineas”—a probable reference to slaves from West
Africa. MICHAEL BARONE, THE NEW AMERICANS: HOW THE MELTING POT CAN WORK AGAIN
143 (2001).
24 Congressman Horace Davis, Speech on Chinese Immigration in the House of
Representatives, 3 (June 8, 1878) [hereinafter Davis Speech], available at
http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb7h4nb21q/?order=3&brand=calisphere.
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of California to clear the land and lay the tracks for the then-expanding
economy. By the time of the severe recession that seized the United
States in the 1870s, “many thousands of unemployed men” were saying
“with great bitterness that but for their presence work and bread would
be plenty.” 25 The very frugality and industriousness of the Chinese
were turned as arguments against them; they were accused of degrading
labor and displacing white workers, of being by nature “voluntary
slaves,” capable of subsisting and living cheaply like vermin and
sending their wages back to China rather than spending them in the
United States. 26 Opponents warned that masses of Chinese would
render America an “Asiatic state” 27 and that in San Francisco, “the
constant dashing of a dark wave of immigration making daily more and
more inroad on the white portion of the city” was an “invasion” that
threatened to render San Francisco a “purely Asiatic city unless some
means are devised to avert this calamity.” 28 The fear over the racial
transformation of California presents a parallel with contemporary fears,
voiced, for example, by Senator Russell Pearce, sponsor of Arizona
Senate Bill 1070, of America being “overrun” by “illegal aliens” and
transformed into Mexico. 29
In another tactic with parallels to our present, the vilified alien
“Chinaman” was associated with crime, with advocates of anti-Chinese
25 Id.; see also, e.g., An Address from the Workingmen of San Francisco to their Brothers
Throughout
the
Pacific
Coast,
2
(Aug.
16,
1888),
available
at
http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb7199n8g9/?order=2&brand=oac (summarizing recessiondecades’ animosity towards the Chinese, accusing them of bringing blight wherever they spread
so that “white laborers all over the State were not wanted except at starving rates of wages” and
the “cities soon became crowded with white men seeking employment”).
26 See, e.g., COMM. OF SENATE OF CAL., CHINESE IMMIGRATION: THE SOCIAL, MORAL AND
POLITICAL EFFECT OF CHINESE IMMIGRATION 7, 41 (1877) [hereinafter 1877 SENATE OF CAL.
REPORT],
available
at
http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb538nb0d6/
?order=2&brand=oac (referring to the Chinese as “voluntary slaves” subsisting “like vermin”);
JOSEPH M. KINLEY, REMARKS ON CHINESE IMMIGRATION 1, 3-5, 11 (1877), available at
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb3d5n996b/?order=2&brand=oac4 (quasi-slave labor);
Senator Aaron A. Sargent, Speech on Immigration of Chinese in the United States Senate, 1, 6
(May
2,
1876)
[hereinafter
Sargent
Speech],
available
at
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb0j49n3vp/?order=2&brand=oac4 (explaining that the
“very industries” of “this strange and dangerously unassimilative people” were a vice displacing
white workers); Gen. A.M. Winn, President, Mechanics’ State Council of California, Valedictory
Address, 4-5 (Jan. 11, 1871) [hereinafter Winn Valedictory Address], available at
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb2779n54f/?order=2&brand=oac4 (decrying the futility of
competing against nomads with no families to support, packed into squalid living conditions and
toiling endlessly without spending); cf. AUGUSTUS LAYRES, EVIDENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION ON
THE PACIFIC COAST IN FAVOR OF CHINESE IMMIGRATION 10-11 (1879), available at
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb8j49n9mf/
?order=2&brand=oac4 (noting, in a pro-Chinese pamphlet, the irony that the very docility,
industriousness and frugality of the Chinese were arguments against them).
27 Davis Speech, supra note 24, at 8.
28 Sargent Speech, supra note 26, at 4.
29 Pearce, supra note 5 (asking rhetorically: “How long will it be before we will be just like
Mexico?”).
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legislation warning that China was sending masses of its unwanted
criminals. 30 The Chinese were accused of, among other things, selling
and buying their women, gambling, prostitution, thievery, and violence
against whites. 31 Like anti-immigrant advocates today, 32 anti-Chinese
advocates pointed to incarceration statistics to back their claim. For
example, a report by the California Senate stated that the inference that
“a large proportion of criminals” were among the Chinese was
“abundantly sustained” by the fact that “of five hundred and forty-five
of the foreign criminals in our State Prison, one hundred and ninetyeight are Chinese—nearly two-fifths of the whole—while our jails and
reformatories swarm with the lower grade of malefactors.” 33 The report
also deplored the costs of incarcerating Chinese criminals. 34
In a third striking parallel with our present, fractious political
groups campaigned against the presidential administration tenuously in
power by whipping up anti-immigrant sentiment. In the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, national politics was closely divided, with
control of Congress and the presidency frequently shifting between the
two parties. 35 Two “minority presidents” failed to win a majority of the
vote and two presidents were elected on close splits, with a bare
majority of less than 25,000 votes. 36 In an example of the tactics of the
anti-administration reform politics of the era, a “Committee of Fifty”
assembled in San Francisco decried the President and national
government for “wantonly den[ying] to the people of the
Pacific . . . relief from a scourge that menaces their very existence”—
the “invasion of the subjects of the Mongolian empire.” 37 They
castigated the Republican presidents for opposing their calls to purge
the Chinese, ignoring their “pleading for deliverance.” 38 Compare this
with the outcry against the national government by the Tea Party,
Minutemen and other groups criticizing the alleged failure to stem the
30 E.g., 1877 SENATE OF CAL. REPORT, supra note 26, at 31-32; Philip A. Roach, Senator of
the District of Monterey and Santa Cruz, Minority Report on the Bill to Enforce Contracts for
Labor Within the State of California (Mar. 20, 1852), reprinted in Winn Valedictory Address,
supra note 26, at 7, 8-9.
31 1877 SENATE OF CAL. REPORT, supra note 26, at 5, 20-31 (women in servitude); Winn
Valedictory Address, supra note 26, at 5 (describing gambling dens and “other dark dens where
crimes that cannot be named are habitually committed”).
32 See, e.g., Border States Deal with More Illegal Immigrant Crime than Most, Data Suggest,
FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 30, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/04/29/border-statesdealing-illegal-immigrant-crime-data-suggests.
33 1877 SENATE OF CAL. REPORT, supra note 26, at 4.
34 Id. at 4, 28.
35 ELMER CLARENCE SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA 111
(Illini Books 1991) (1939).
36 Id.
37 ADDRESS BY THE COMMITTEE OF FIFTY TO THE PEOPLE 1 (n.d.), available at
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb7t1nb2fw/?order=2&brand=oac4.
38 Id. at 2-3.
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“invasion” over the United States-Mexico border. 39 In a similarly
fractious political environment, after a grinding recession and closely
divided politics, when national politicians were forced to “champion[]
legislative measures which they otherwise might have opposed,” 40 the
infamous Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, banning Chinese laborers
from immigrating and any Chinese from naturalizing, 41 was passed.
B.

Déjà Vu Laws

The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 is often cited as the
paradigmatic piece of anti-Chinese legislation. 42 Well before the
Chinese Exclusion Act, however, state and local laws were deployed in
an attempt to expel the Chinese both directly, as well as through indirect
methods, such as licensing, housing and criminal laws.
Some avenues of anti-immigrant legislation were closed to the
states early on, but that did not prevent repeated tries. In 1949, the
Supreme Court held in The Passenger Cases that states may not
interfere with the federal power to regulate foreign commerce by
imposing passenger head taxes on ships entering a port. 43 In one of
eight opinions in the case, Justice McLean suggested that while “the
municipal power of a State cannot prohibit the introduction of
foreigners brought to this country under the authority of Congress,” the
state could “guard its citizens against diseases and paupers” by denying
foreigners residence unless “security” was posted “to indemnify the
public should they become paupers.” 44 Apparently acting on this
suggestion, in 1852 the California legislature enacted a law requiring a
bond of $500 per non-citizen passenger. 45 By 1855, however, the
39 For a fieldwork-based portrait of critiques of the federal government by groups such as the
Minutemen, see Mary D. Fan, When Deterrence and Death Mitigation Fall Short: Fantasy and
Fetishes as Gap-Fillers in Border Regulation, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 701 (2008). See also, e.g.,
John M. Broder, The Nation: Border War; Immigration, From a Simmer to a Scream, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 2006, § 4, at 41; Marc Lacey, Taking Their Fight on Illegal Immigrants to the
Arizona Border, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at A9.
40 SANDMEYER, supra note 35, at 111.
41 Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, §§ 1, 14, 22 Stat. 58 (1882). The Act also made it a
misdemeanor to bring in Chinese laborers. Id. § 2.
42 See, e.g., Roger Daniels, Foreword to SANDMEYER, supra note 35, at 3 (stating that the
legislation “mark[ed] the beginning of a period of more than eight decades (1882-1965) in which
the immigration policy of the United States was officially racist”). A point of difference on dates:
From Congress’s first legislation on citizenship in 1790, limiting naturalization to “white
persons,” immigration law was raced. For an excellent account of the racial identity litigation
that ensued by people seeking entry into the national community, see LÓPEZ, supra note 22.
43 Smith v. Turner (The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
44 Id. at 406 (McLean, J.).
45 Act of May 3, 1852, ch. 36, §§ 1-2, 1852 Cal. Stat. 78, 78-79, repealed by Act of Apr. 27,
1945, ch. 111, § 5, 1945 Cal. Stat. 424, 465. The 1852 Act was struck down by the California
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legislature had gotten bolder and enacted a direct tax titled “An Act to
Discourage the Immigration to this State of Persons Who Cannot
Become Citizens Thereof” 46 —in other words, a tax to discourage the
immigration of non-whites, because, since 1790, Congress had limited
naturalization to “a free white person.” 47 The 1855 California law
required ship masters or owners to pay a fifty dollar head tax for any
person “incompetent” to become a citizen. 48 This unsubtle law was
struck down two years later by the California Supreme Court in People
v. Downer. 49 Downer arose out of an action to exact $12,750 in head
tax against the owners of the ship “Stephen Baldwin” for bearing 250
Chinese passengers. 50 On the authority of The Passenger Cases, the
California Supreme Court ruled that the capitation tax was an
impermissible interference with the federal power to regulate foreign
commerce. 51
Undaunted, the California legislature in 1858 enacted another
unsubtle law in an attempt to steer immigration policy—“An Act to
Prevent the Further Immigration of Chinese or Mongolians to this
State”—which forbade Chinese or Mongolians from entering the state
or its ports. 52 The act made it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or
imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than a year, for
Chinese to land or to bring Chinese in. 53 When California attempted to
enforce the law, the California Supreme Court declared it void and
unconstitutional in an opinion never reported. 54
In 1875, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a modified version of
the California statute requiring the posting of a $500 bond per Chinese
woman who the Commissioner of Immigration, in his discretion,
deemed at risk of being a “lewd and debauched” person. 55 Justice
Field, riding circuit, had earlier ordered the release of Chinese women
held under the statute, ruling that “the intercourse of foreigners with our
people, their immigration to this country and residence therein, is
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the general government, and is not
Supreme Court two decades later in State v. Steamship Constitution, 42 Cal. 578, 589-90 (1872),
as an impermissible interference in foreign commerce.
46 Act of Apr. 28, 1855, ch. 153, §§ 1-2, 1855 Cal. Stat. 194, repealed by Act of Mar. 30,
1955, ch. 46, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 487, 487-88.
47 Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, repealed by Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 414.
48 § 1, 1855 Cal. Stat. at 194.
49 7 Cal. 169 (1857).
50 Id. at 169.
51 Id. at 171.
52 Act of Apr. 26, 1858, ch. 313, § 1, 1858 Cal. Stat. 295, 295-96, repealed by Act of Mar. 30,
1955, ch. 46, § 1, 1955 Cal. Stat. 487, 487-88.
53 Id. §§ 1-2.
54 See Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 538 (1862) (recounting that the Supreme Court
informed counsel of this history from the bench).
55 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1875).
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subject to state control or interference.” 56 Enfolded in Justice Field’s
analysis were burgeoning equality concerns. He stated that antiChinese feelings could not “justify any legislation for their exclusion,
which might not be adopted against the inhabitants of the most favored
nations of the Caucasian race, and of Christian faith.” 57 He deplored
the discrimination in laws ostensibly aimed at debauched women that
are “shocked when a frail child of China is landed on our shores, and
yet allow[] the bedizened and painted harlot of other countries to parade
our streets and open her hells in broad day, without molestation and
without censure.” 58 He concluded that an alternative basis for
invalidating the legislation was the newly enacted legislation of 1870,
implementing the equal protection guarantee of the recently adopted
Fourteenth Amendment. 59 In Chy Lung v. Freeman, a unanimous Court
ruled that the law impermissibly interfered with the power of Congress
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, reasoning in essence that
one state could not inflict nationwide externalities marring foreign
relations and trade. 60
While the Court did not address the discrimination argument
Justice Field had eloquently sketched earlier, the Court obliquely
deplored the “extraordinary statute” that gave the Commissioner
arbitrary discretion to require bonds for any passenger that looked to
him to be an “idiot” or a potential “pauper” or “lewd woman.” 61 Such
unbounded discretion opened the door to “systematic extortion of the
grossest kind,” the Court wrote. 62 The specter of discrimination was
thus obliquely acknowledged in the guise of concern over the law’s
conferral of open-ended discretion through vague terms. Chy Lung’s
arbitrariness analysis was thus an intriguing precursor to vagueness
doctrine cases a century later, such as Papachristou v. Jacksonville,
which addressed antidiscrimination concerns in the guise of
arbitrariness and vagueness analysis. 63
The legislature and localities also tried alternative ways to drive
out the Chinese, such as licensing, taxes, employment and housing laws.
In May 1852, the California legislature revived a tax on foreign miners
that had previously been used to drive out Latin American miners, 64
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

In re Ah Fong, 1 F. Cas. 213, 216 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874).
Id. at 217.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 278-80.
Id. at 277-78.
Id. at 278.
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (invalidating on vagueness
grounds an anti-vagrancy ordinance that permitted arrests on grounds such as “loafing,” being a
“vagrant,” and “wandering or strolling” without apparent “lawful purpose or object”).
64 Doris Marion Wright, The Making of Cosmopolitan California: An Analysis of
Immigration 1848-1870, 19 CAL. HIST. SOC’Y Q. 323, 330 (1940).
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assessing a three dollar per month license fee on foreign miners. 65 By
1855—“perhaps the high-water mark of anti-Chinese sentiment in the
legislature for the entire decade”—harsher measures were being
debated, with a committee of the California assembly recommending an
outright ban on Chinese miners. 66 The extreme proposal failed, but
taxes were doubled to six dollars per month, with annual increases of
two dollars per month for foreigners “ineligible to become citizens of
the United States”—a vast and spiraling sum that had the manifest
object “to drive the subjects of it—the Chinese—from the State,” as
lawyers for the Chinese recounted. 67 The amount was later reduced to
four dollars per month at the urging of businessmen desiring trade with
China, and missionaries repelled by racism and hopeful of gaining
Chinese Christian converts. 68 Despite the failure of the statewide
outright ban on Chinese miners, some local mining districts enacted
bans on “Asiatics” or the Chinese in their bylaws. 69
In 1862, another anti-Chinese tax of $2.50 per Chinese person was
passed. Formally titled “An Act to Protect Free White Labor Against
Competition with Chinese Coolie Labor, and to Discourage the
Immigration of the Chinese into the State of California,” 70 the
legislation was dubbed the “Anti-Coolie Act.” 71 That same year, a
fractured California Supreme Court identified the law for what it was—
yet another strategy to drive out the Chinese—and struck it down as an
impermissible interference with the federal power to regulate
commerce, including federal laws permitting the flow of foreign
peoples. 72
California was particularly hard-hit by the 1870s recession, the
worst the fledgling nation had experienced, and widespread
unemployment, mortgage foreclosures, and homelessness stirred radical
reactions and calls for state constitutional reform. 73 The anti-Chinese
campaign was intensifying, stirred by rabble-rousers such as Dennis
65 Act of May 4, 1852, ch. 37, § 6, 1852 Cal. Stat. 84, 85, repealed by Act of Apr. 26, 1939,
ch. 93, 1939 Cal. Stat. 1067, 1215.
66 CHARLES J. MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 17 (1994).
67 See Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534, 536 (1862) (summarizing the account of antiChinese laws by lawyers for Lin Sing).
68 MCCLAIN, supra note 66, at 18-20.
69 See Mark Kanazawa, Immigration, Exclusion, and Taxation: Anti-Chinese Legislation in
Gold Rush California, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 779, 783 (2005).
70 Act of Apr. 26, 1862, ch. 339, § 1, 1862 Cal. Stat. 462,462, repealed by Act of May 16,
1939, ch. 154, 1939 Cal. Stat. 1274, 1376. The Act exempted those engaged in the manufacture
of sugar, rice, coffee and tea. Id.
71 THE ROCKY ROAD TO LIBERTY: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY OF CHINESE IMMIGRATION
AND EXCLUSION 215 (Sen Hu & Jielin Dong eds., 2010).
72 Lin Sing, 20 Cal. at 565-66, 575-80.
73 See Harry N. Scheiber, Race, Radicalism, and Reform: Historical Perspective on the 1879
California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 35, 36-37 (1989).
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Kearney of the self-styled “Workingmen’s Party.” 74 The resulting
revised California Constitution of 1879 included an article, simply titled
“Chinese,” that captured the anti-Chinese friend-enemy politics of the
times. The provision is striking to read in comparison to contemporary
accusations about “illegal aliens.” Section 1 of the “Chinese” article
directed the legislature to protect against “the burdens and evils arising
from the presence of aliens who are or may become vagrants, paupers,
mendicants, criminals, or invalids afflicted with contagious or infectious
diseases, and from aliens otherwise dangerous or detrimental to the
well-being or peace of the State . . . .” 75 Sections 2 and 3 forbade
corporations from employing any Chinese or Mongolian and forbade
the employment of Chinese in any state, county, municipal or other
public work “except in punishment for crime.” 76 Lest there be any
doubt about the intent of the article and the politics of fear on which it
was founded, the final section declared: “The presence of foreigners
ineligible to become citizens of the United States is declared to be
dangerous to the well-being of the State, and the Legislature shall
discourage their immigration by all the means within its power.” 77
In response, the legislature enacted laws criminalizing the
employment of Chinese on pain of fines, imprisonment of at least two
hundred days and up to two years, and forfeiture of the corporate
charter, franchise and privileges upon second conviction. 78
Businessman Tiburcio Parrott was imprisoned for an alleged violation
of the law. 79 He appealed his conviction, arguing first that the antiChinese law was void because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment
and legislation implementing the equal protection guarantee. 80 Two
judges wrote for the federal Circuit Court for the District of California,
which invalidated the conviction and voided the anti-Chinese
employment laws. Judge Hoffman noted, in an early interest-tying type
of argument, that the law “might equally well have forbidden the
employment of Irish, or Germans, or Americans, or persons of color, or
it might have required the employment of any of these classes of
persons to the exclusion of the rest.” 81 He primarily grounded his
decision not in the violation of the rights of the Chinese, but rather in
the violation of the rights of corporations, many of which he noted had
ceased operations or faced closure if the anti-Chinese laws were
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 39-40.
CAL. CONST., art. XIX, § 1 (repealed Nov. 4, 1952).
Id. §§ 2-3.
Id. § 4.
See In re Tiburcio Parrott, 1 F. 481, 483-84 (C.C.D. Cal. 1880) (summarizing laws at

issue).
79
80
81

Id. at 483.
Id. at 484.
Id. at 491 (Hoffman, J.).
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enforced. 82 He held that the right of corporations “to utilize their
property, by employing such laborers as they choose” could not be
overridden by the prohibited purpose of driving the Chinese out. 83
Judge Sawyer, in contrast, was less shy about directly ruling that the
California law was in violation of treaty protections, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment and laws implementing the Fourteenth
Amendment that gave “all persons” the “same right” to make and
enforce contracts and enjoy “full and equal benefit of all laws.” 84
Another legal battle was also brewing regarding a housing law that
swept Chinese en masse into prisons, where under a municipal
ordinance their queues—long, low ponytails that custom dictated
Chinese men wear lest misfortune and disgrace befall them—were cut
off. The 1876 law criminalized any person sleeping or lodging in a
room or apartment with less than five hundred cubic feet of space as
well as landlords renting such accommodations. 85 Because Chinese
were often packed into such quarters, many faced fines or jail. Once in
jail, under what was dubbed the “Queue Ordinance,” the queues of
Chinese men were shaved off, a mark of disgrace in the traditions of the
Chinese. 86 Justice Field, again riding circuit, invalidated the Queue
Ordinance as both additional punishment not authorized by statute and a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee
because the ordinance was undisputedly targeting the Chinese and was
not enforced against any other persons. 87 In concluding the decision,
Justice Field noted the deep hostility against the Chinese, but again
admonished California that “[w]hatever is done by way of exclusion”
beyond the exclusion of paupers, the diseased and others likely to be a
burden and thus able to be expelled in a state’s self-defense “must come
from the general government.” 88
Perhaps most famously, in 1886, the U.S. Supreme Court
intervened in Yick Wo v. Hopkins 89 to invalidate the selective
prosecution of Chinese laundry operators. Yick Wo involved a San
Francisco ordinance that criminalized the operation of laundries in
wood buildings—where the vast majority of laundries were housed—
without consent of the board of supervisors, whose “arbitrary”
discretion to consent was a matter of “mere will” unguided by

82
83
84
85
86

Id. at 492-93.
Id. at 493-99.
Id. at 501-10 (Sawyer, J.).
Act of Apr. 3, 1876, ch. 496, §§ 1-2, 1876 Cal. Stat. 759, 759.
See Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 253, 255 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (describing such a

case).
87
88
89

Id. at 253-56.
Id. at 256.
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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standards. 90 This standardless authority was used to put Chinese
laundry owners out of business through withholding of consent and
imprisonment, while non-Chinese owners were allowed to operate. 91
The Supreme Court famously held:
Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition
of the constitution. 92

Apparently undaunted, and still unsatisfied despite passage of the
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, San Francisco resorted to a more
draconian measure in the guise of a housing ordinance. The 1890
ordinance forbade Chinese from living or conducting business in the
city except in a prescribed area, and required removal of Chinese from
their homes to this racialized ghetto. 93 In a brief but evocative decision
invalidating the ordinance, Circuit Judge Sawyer wrote:
The obvious purpose . . . is, for forcibly driv[ing] out a whole
community of twenty-odd thousand people . . . from a whole section
of the city which they have inhabited, and in which they have carried
on all kinds of business . . . for more than 40 years. Many of them
were born there, in their own houses, and are citizens of the United
States . . . . This, besides being discrimination, against the Chinese,
and unequal in its operation as between them and all others, is simply
an arbitrary confiscation of their homes and property, a depriving
them if [sic] it, without due process or any process of law. . . .
That this ordinance is a direct violation, of, not only, the express
provisions of the constitution of the United States, in several
particulars, but also of the express provisions of our several treaties
with China, and of the statutes of the United States, is so obvious,
that I shall not waste more time, or words in discussing the matter. 94

Habits of hatred die hard and more anti-Chinese laws would
follow, even after these repeated repudiations. 95 This plethora of state
and local laws before the turn of the century shows the creativity and
variability of laws used to vent racialized anxieties and challenge and
intervene in federal immigration policy.

90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 368.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 373-74.
See In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359, 359 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890) (reproducing ordinance).
Id. at 361.
See, e.g., Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) (invalidating municipal
law requiring Chinese to be inoculated with dangerous bubonic plague serum and quarantining
the Chinese).
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II. THE RESURGENCE OF STATE AND LOCAL ANTI-“ALIEN” LAWS
Part of the point of examining the history of unruly state and local
passions is to show how even as law evolves, new forms can be vehicles
for old, forbidden impulses to drive out racially distinctive others. The
lesson is important for our avowedly “post-racial” times when racialized
anxieties cannot be voiced openly aloud and must be dressed in
legitimizing constructs that still pursue old goals. From this history, we
can draw lessons as people socialized in the popular politics and fierce
legal controversies of our present.
The tale of our present need not be told in painstaking detail
because we live it now as members of the polity and consumers of
everyday stories of the revived campaign against the “illegal alien.”
The “illegal alien” is a convenient, ostensibly a-racial construct still
imbued with strongly racialized anxieties. Scholars have noted that
despite the seeming cleansing of explicit racial reference from the term
alien, it is suffused with racialized perception, used to refer to
“undocumented Mexicans,” and draws on “stereotypes about Mexicans
as criminals.” 96 Resurgent anti-“alien” state and local laws are also
fueled by anxieties regarding an influx of Mexican and other Latino
people. Two prominent examples in the legal news and potential
pattern legislation for other anti-“alien” laws are the ordinances of the
City of Hazleton and Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070. These state and local
laws vent anger over inflows of Latinos through strategies directed in
form at “illegal aliens,” but that in practice create a hostile environment
for the racially distinctive to dampen their population. 97
A.

The Hazleton Model

As the Third Circuit recently recounted, the City of Hazleton,
Pennsylvania, formerly having a population of 23,000, swelled by
approximately 10,000 people between 2000 and 2007, mostly “due to
an influx of Latino families.” 98 The newcomers included a mix of
96 Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, Something
Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTIIMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 165, 171 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997); see also, e.g.,
MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
AMERICA (2004) (tracing the history of how Mexicans emerged as “the iconic illegal alien”).
97 Cf. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531, 2010 WL 3504538, at *42 (3d Cir. Sept. 9,
2010) (“We recognize, of course, that Hazleton’s housing provisions neither control actual
physical entry into the City, nor physically expel persons from it. Nonetheless, in essence, that is
precisely what they attempt to do.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
98 Id. at *1.
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citizens, lawful permanent residents, and undocumented immigrants,
generally moving from New York and New Jersey to Pennsylvania. 99
Beginning in July 2006, the Hazleton City Council began enacting a
series of ordinances to address accusations that “aliens lacking lawful
status were to blame” for a host of problems such as overburdening
social services, including public education and health care, dampening
wages and job availability, aggravating crime and disorder, introducing
dangerous criminal gangs, and saddling the public with increased
incarceration costs. 100 While the city’s expert reports 101 were careful to
refer to the impact of the “immigrants” or “illegal aliens” as an abstract
a-racial construct, it was clearly a proxy for concern over Latinos. For
example, an expert report for Hazleton referred to the large increase in
public school enrollment and dramatic increase in the number of
English as a Second Language students in concluding, “[t]he taxpayers
of Hazleton have felt the result of illegal immigration.” 102 This line of
logic shows the conflation of Latino influx with illegal immigration.
Beginning in July 2006, the City of Hazleton began enacting
ordinances venting its displeasure with the surge of newcomers. The
first, titled the “Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance,” prohibited
employing or harboring undocumented aliens in the city. 103 The
“Tenant Registration Ordinance” followed in August 2006 and
mandated that tenants secure an occupancy permit, which required
proof of lawful citizenship or residency. 104
Several plaintiffs filed suit in August 2006 challenging the
Registration and Illegal Immigration Ordinances. 105
The Illegal
Immigration Ordinance was subsequently supplanted in September
2006 by the “Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance” and “Official
English Ordinance,” and was again amended in December 2006 and
during the 2007 trial. 106 As amended, the Illegal Immigration
99
100

Id.
Id.; Expert Report & Affidavit of George J. Borjas, The Labor Mkt. Impact of Immigration,
Lozano, 2010 WL 3504538 (No. 06CV01586); Expert Report & Affidavit of Steven A.
Camarota, Illegal Immigration’s Impact on Pub. Educ. & Cmtys., Lozano, 2010 WL 3504538,
(No. 06CV01586) [hereinafter Camarota Report]; Expert Report & Affidavit of Jared L. Lewis,
Lozano, 2010 WL 3504538 (No. 06CV01586); Expert Report & Affidavit of John L. Martin,
Statement Regarding the Fiscal Impact of Illegal Aliens, Lozano, 2010 WL 3504538 (No.
06CV01586).
101 See supra note 100.
102 Camarota Report, supra note 100.
103 Hazleton,
Pa.,
Ordinance
2006-10
(July
13,
2006),
available
at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0003.pdf.
104 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15, 2006), available at http://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0020.pdf.
105 Complaint, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (No.
3:06cv1586).
106 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://
www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0010.pdf, as amended by Hazleton, Pa.,
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Ordinance began by declaring that “illegal aliens harm the health, safety
and welfare of authorized US workers and legal residents”; heighten
crime rates; overburden public services such as hospitals, “increasing
their cost and diminishing their availability to legal residents”; and
generally “diminish[] our overall quality of life.” 107 This text echoed
some of the accusations of Hazleton’s mayor, Lou Barletta, who argued
that “the small-town quality of life we had come to enjoy was being
destroyed by criminal aliens who were driving up our crime rate,”
draining social services, and taking away jobs. 108 Mayor Barletta was
an advocate of strategies to induce “self-deport[ation].” 109
With echoes of the 1880 San Francisco municipal laws that
leveraged the power of regulating corporations to bar the employment
of Chinese, 110 Hazleton’s Illegal Immigration Ordinance leveraged the
licensing power to bar employment of illegal aliens. 111 Under the
ordinance, business owners must submit sworn affidavits affirming that
they do not knowingly employ unlawful workers and face suspension of
their business permit if an undocumented employee is discovered and
not terminated within three days. 112 Upon a second or subsequent
violation, the permit is suspended for twenty days. 113 A safe harbor is
offered as incentive for employers to check immigration status using the
“Basic Pilot Program,” 114 also known as E-Verify. E-Verify is a federal
trial program that is more effective than the regular I-9 verification
process in catching those unauthorized to work, but has resulted in
“unintentional discrimination” against foreign-born naturalized citizens
and work-authorized individuals because of high nonconfirmation rates
due to database problems. 115 The E-Verify system is Internet based and
electronically checks Social Security Administration and Department of
Homeland Security records in determining employment eligibility.116
The leveraging of the licensing power took advantage of a savings
Ordinance 2006-40 (Dec. 28, 2006), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0016.pdf, and Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2007-6 (Mar. 21, 2007),
available at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/hazletonord607.pdf.
107 Id. § 2(C).
108 Press Release, Lou Barletta, Mayor, City of Hazleton (Sept. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.smalltowndefenders.com.
109 Id. (“[T]he main line of defense against illegal immigration is to eliminate the availability
of jobs to illegal aliens. If illegal aliens have no place to work, they will self-deport.”).
110 See infra Part I.B.
111 Ordinance 2006-18, § 4.
112 Id.
113 Id. § 4(B)(7).
114 Id. § 4(B)(5).
115 See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BASIC
PILOT PROGRAM 3 (2004), available at http://www.iwj.org/doc/USCIS%20report%20
Basic%20Pilot%2006-04.pdf.
116 See Ariz. Contractors Ass’n v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (D. Ariz. 2007)
(describing the E-Verify system).
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clause for “licensing and similar laws” in the express preemption
provision of the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)
regulating the employment of undocumented workers. 117
Besides the employment provisions, the Illegal Immigration
Ordinance also created the offense of “harboring illegal aliens” for
providing housing to illegal aliens knowingly or in reckless disregard of
the fact of illegal alien status. 118 Failure to evict illegal aliens within
five business days of written notice results in denial or suspension of a
rental license and $250 fines for subsequent violations. 119 These
housing provisions are further supplemented by the Registration
Ordinance, which requires tenants to obtain occupancy permits upon
proof of, among other things, “legal citizenship and/or residency.” 120
Private and public surveillance is used to enforce the ordinances.
Any city resident, business owner or official may initiate a complaint
regarding illegal aliens being employed or housed. 121 Until the city
amended it in the course of the trial, the ordinance provided, “[a]
complaint which alleges a violation solely or primarily on the basis of
national origin, ethnicity, or race shall be deemed invalid and shall not
be enforced.” 122 In the course of the trial, the ordinance was amended
to provide, “[a] complaint which alleges a violation on the basis of
national origin, ethnicity or race shall be deemed invalid and shall not
be enforced.” 123 Despite the intense controversy over the small
municipality’s laws, described as the “nation’s strictest” and “designed
to make the city one of the most hostile in the country for illegal
immigrants,” 124 numerous state and local laws now have “provisions
that are either identical or similar to provisions in Hazleton’s
ordinances.” 125

117 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (“The provisions of this section preempt any State or
local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws)
upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”).
118 Ordinance 2006-18, § 5.
119 Id. § 5(B)(4), (8).
120 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13, § 7(B)(1)(g) (Aug. 15, 2006).
121 Ordinance 2006-18, § 4(B)(1), 5(B)(1).
122 Id. §§ 4(B)(2), 5(B)(2) (emphasis added).
123 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2007-6, §§ 4(B)(2), 5(B)(2) (Mar. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/hazletonord607.pdf.
124 Associated Press, Pennsylvania Town Enacts Strict Illegal Immigration Ordinance,
FOXNEWS.COM (July 14, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,203513,00.html (also
quoting opponent arguing that the ordinance would make Hazleton “the first Nazi city in the
country”).
125 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531, 2010 WL 3504538, at *24 (3d Cir. Sept. 9,
2010).
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Arizona’s Approaches

In the toughness and controversy contest, Arizona’s Senate Bill
1070, enacted this summer, has seized the title from Hazleton. 126 The
stated purpose of the Arizona bill is to attain “attrition through
enforcement”—that is, to grind down the population of unlawful aliens
and their economic activity. 127 Even before the headline-grabbing
legislation, however, Arizona had made a foray into investigating and
adjudicating, as well as sanctioning, immigration law violations in
legislation similar to, but in some aspects even more aggressive than,
Hazleton’s regulation of the employment of undocumented persons
couched as a licensing law.
1.

State Investigation and Adjudication of Employers

During the earlier anti-immigrant political broil that seized the
nation, Arizona enacted the Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007. 128
That legislation also sought to leverage the state licensing power and the
savings clause in the express preemption provision of IRCA for
“licensing and similar laws” 129 into the expansive power to investigate,
adjudicate, and sanction the employment of unauthorized workers.
The legislation not only imposes potentially more severe state
sanctions for employing undocumented workers, but also prescribes
more aggressive state procedures for investigating and adjudicating
suspected undocumented workers than federal law. The Arizona law
makes it a state law offense to “knowingly” or “intentionally” employ
“an unauthorized alien” and requires Arizona’s Attorney General to
create anonymous complaint forms for alleging that a business is
employing an unauthorized alien. 130
Upon receiving such an
anonymous complaint duly filed on the prescribed form, the state
Attorney General must investigate and, if the complaint is not “false and
frivolous,” must, among other things, notify the relevant county
attorney to bring a state law enforcement action. 131 Though the state
law incorporates the federal law definition of “unauthorized alien” and
126 See Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 2010, at A1 (terming the law “the nation’s toughest bill on illegal immigration”).
127 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010).
128 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to 23-216 (2010).
129 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
130 §§ 23-212(A)-(B), -212.01(A)-(B).
131 §§ 23-212(B)-(D), -212.01(B)-(D) (couching the duty to investigate duly filed anonymous
complaints in the mandatory “shall”).
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directs the state court to “consider only the federal government’s
determination pursuant to United States Code § 1373(c),” which
provides for federal checks of citizenship and immigration status, the
federal determination creates only a “rebuttable presumption of the
employee’s lawful status.” 132 Thus, under the Arizona law, an
anonymous complaint can lead to a mandatory investigation and
adjudication in state court, which may reach a conclusion regarding
authorization to work different from the federal determination.
In another departure from the federal immigration investigation
and enforcement scheme, the Arizona law mandates that employers
verify employment eligibility of new hires using the E-Verify system
after December 31, 2007. 133 Registration and participation in the EVerify program in general is further mandatory for employers who
receive “any grant, loan or performance-based incentive” from any state
governmental entity after September 30, 2008. 134 These provisions are
thus even more aggressive than an incentives-based strategy and flatly
require use of the E-Verify system though it is only a voluntary pilot
program under federal law in part because of concerns for the risk of
error and resultant discrimination. 135
On the sanction side, penalties for a first-time knowing or
intentional violation include: mandated quarterly reporting of new hires
for a probation period of three years for knowing violations and five
years for intentional violations; required termination of all unauthorized
aliens; and submission of an affidavit confirming the termination and
commitment not to knowingly or intentionally hire an unauthorized
alien. 136 For a first-time intentional violation, the business license is
also mandatorily suspended for a minimum of ten days, while for a firsttime knowing violation, the court has discretion to suspend the business
license for a maximum of ten days. 137 The business license is
permanently revoked upon a second knowing or intentional violation. 138
The legislation thus levies what then-Arizona Governor Janet
Napolitano called a “business death penalty” by stripping businesses of
their licenses, defined broadly to include, for example, foundational
documents necessary to existence such as articles of incorporation. 139
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

§§ 23-212(H), -212.01(H).
§ 23-214(A).
§ 23-214(B).
See supra text accompanying notes 114-15.
§ 23-212(F)(1), -212.01(F)(1).
Id.
§§ 23-212(F)(3), -212.01(F)(3).
§ 23-211(9) (defining license to mean “any agency permit, certificate, approval,
registration, charter or similar form of authorization that is required by law and that is issued by
any agency for the purposes of operating a business in this state,” and to include, for example,
articles of incorporation or certificates of partnership); Greg Stohr, ‘Business Death Penalty’ for
Hiring Illegal Aliens Unites Obama, Companies, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 8, 2010, 12:01 AM),
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“Attrition Through Enforcement” and the
Police Surveillance State

Even while the constitutionality of the earlier foray into
immigration law investigation and enforcement was pending before the
U.S. Supreme Court, 140 Arizona enacted the even more aggressive
Arizona Senate Bill 1070. 141 The latest Arizona legislation was fueled
by incendiary politics painting Arizona as a state under siege and
equating immigration with rampant crime. For example, Arizona
Governor Jan Brewer took to the airwaves to proclaim, “We cannot
afford all this illegal immigration and everything that comes with it,
everything from the crime and to the drugs and the kidnappings and the
extortion and the beheadings and the fact that people can't feel safe in
their community. It's wrong! It's wrong!” 142 The tragic and highly
emotionally salient shooting of Arizona rancher Robert Krentz by a
suspected illegal border crosser was used to amplify the prevalent
“illegal alien crime wave” theme, 143 though the tragedy was a relative
anomaly and a Border Patrol spokesman reported he was unaware of
any illegal alien having murdered a U.S. citizen in the region for more
than a decade. 144 Paul Babeu, president of the Arizona Sheriff’s
Association and an elected official with political incentives, also helped
sound the crime and immigration alarm, telling FOX News that criminal
“illegals” were to blame for Arizona having “the highest crime rates in
America.” 145
In reality, Arizona is experiencing an equally or even greater
decline in crime than the national average. 146 Graphs 1 and 2 plot crime

http://bx.businessweek.com/business-and-the-supreme-court/view?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.
bloomberg.com%2Fnews%2F2010-12-08%2F-business-death-penalty-immigrant-case-unitesobama-companies.html.
140 See Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010) (granting certiorari). For
the procedural history, see infra text accompanying notes 198-204. This subpart lays the
foundation for later analysis by explaining key provisions and the evolution of strategy.
141 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010).
142 On the Record with Greta Van Susteren: Arizona Continues Immigration Battle—Part 1
(FOX News television broadcast June 16, 2010) (interviewing Gov. Jan Brewer) (transcript
available at 2010 WLNR 12337754).
143 See, e.g., R. Cort Kirkwood, Crime Wave, NEW AM., Jan. 8, 2007, at 18 (example of
theme); Andrew Purcell, Panic over Mexican Drug War Fuels US Anti-Immigration Drive,
SUNDAY HERALD (Glasgow), Aug. 1, 2010, at 34 (reporting on theme).
144 Dennis Wagner, Rancher’s Murder Fuels Firestorm, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 30, 2010, at
B1.
145 See FOX News, AZ Gov: Signs Immigration Bill into Law (FOX television broadcast Apr.
23, 2010), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YENGkp6lRE0 (interviewing Paul
Babeu, President, Arizona Sheriff’s Association).
146 Nicholas Riccardi, Playing the Crime Card in Arizona: Both Sides in the IllegalImmigration Debate Have Statistics to Bolster Their Cases, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at A10.
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rate data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports for Arizona compared
to the nation as a whole.
Graph 1.
Graph 1: Arizona vrs. National Violent Crime Rate
Per 100,000 of the Population
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Graph 2.
Graph 2: Arizona vrs. National Property Crime Rate
Per 100,000 of the Population
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As depicted in the graphs, in reality, Arizona’s crime rate, like that
of the nation overall, has been falling dramatically in recent years.
Indeed, in 2009, Arizona enjoyed a lower violent crime rate than the
nation overall. Arizona’s property crime rate has also been dropping.
And while the curve for Arizona’s property crime rate has been higher
than the national average, by 2009, the gap was narrowing because
Arizona has been experiencing a steeper decline in property crimes than
the national average. Moreover, crime rates have been flat in Arizona
border towns whose denizens and officials express bemusement at the
political imagery of rampant violence besetting their communities. 147
Indeed, sociologists have argued that rather than aggravating
crime, immigrants have a “protective” effect against crime because of
such factors as their diluting violent street culture with new norms,
downplaying violence as the appropriate response to perceived slights,
having strong family and ethnic ties, and revitalizing abandoned or
malaised neighborhoods. 148 A new study using pooled cross-sectional
time-series data found that cities with the greatest declines in homicides
and robberies had the largest influx of immigrants. 149
But perception—and social cascades of misperception spurred by
opinion leaders—are what count in politics. And the immigration-crime
paradigm helped spur passage of Arizona Senate Bill 1070, the fierce
product of fierce politics. Bill co-sponsor State Representative John
Kavanagh furthered the theme of anti-illegal immigrant legislation as a
public safety measure, saying of the undocumented, “[t]hey bring a lot
of crime with them.” 150 Public safety professionals, however, explain
that the perverse effect of Arizona Senate Bill 1070 is to undermine
public safety by eroding the delicate trust that police professionals have
built with immigrant communities to create intelligence-gathering and
crime-fighting partnerships and prevent predation on vulnerable
undocumented persons. 151
147
148

Wagner, supra note 10.
Robert J. Sampson, Rethinking Crime and Immigration, CONTEXTS, Winter 2008, at 28,
29-33, available at http://contexts.org/articles/files/2008/01/contexts_winter08_sampson.pdf;
Wadsworth, supra note 11, at 535-38.
149 Wadsworth, supra note 11, at 544-46, 549-50.
150 Riccardi, supra note 146.
151 See, e.g., Randal C. Archibold, Arizona’s Effort to Bolster Local Immigration Authority
Divides Law Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2010, at A16 (noting concerns of opponents,
such as the Arizona Association of Chiefs of Police, and division among the law enforcement
community over the legislation); Tim Gaynor, Arizona Police Officer Challenges Migrant Law,
REUTERS, June 5, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6541T320100605
(reporting concern among police chiefs and beat officers in Hispanic communities); Alia Beard
Rau & JJ Hensley, Police Weighing Bill’s Impact, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 2010, at A1 (noting
concern of former Mesa, Arizona Police Chief that legislation would have “catastrophic impacts
on community policing”).
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From the wisdom of experience in the field, many police agencies
have realized the need to promote positive communication and trust
with immigrant communities and have operated under “noncooperation” laws—ordinances and directives providing that state and
local police are not in the business of enforcing federal immigration
law. 152 The agreements avoid the problem of valuable intelligence
being lost 153 due to witnesses’ fear to step forward and crime victims’
fear to turn to police. 154 The Arizona law upended this delicate balance
by barring state and local police from declining to enforce federal
immigration law. 155
Perhaps most controversially, the Arizona law requires that law
enforcement officers in any lawful stop, detention or arrest attempt to
determine immigration status if “reasonable suspicion exists that the
person is an alien who is unlawfully present” unless “the determination
may hinder or obstruct an investigation.” 156 As originally enacted, the
law provided that officers “may not solely consider race, color or
national origin,” 157 apparently taking advantage of the Supreme Court’s
1975 decision in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce providing that race
can be a relevant—albeit not sole—factor in establishing reasonable
suspicion of alienage. 158 Brignoni-Ponce held that “[t]he likelihood that
any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to
make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does
not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.” 159
In response to the firestorm of controversy, the Arizona legislature
152 See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law in Support
of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 11, United States v. Arizona, No. 10-1413
(D.
Ariz.
July
8,
2010),
available
at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv2/
groups/public/@nyu_law_website__centers__center_on_administration_of_criminal_law/docum
ents/documents/ecm_pro_066096.pdf (noting that at least seventy-three cities, towns, counties
and states, including Los Angeles, D.C., Seattle, San Francisco and New York City, have at
various times had such “non-cooperation” provisions to encourage community trust).
153 The concern about intelligence being lost for lack of trust of police is particularly acute as
community policing turns to national security policing in immigrant Muslim communities. See,
e.g., Jytte Klausen, British Counter-Terrorism After 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to the
Fight Against Domestic Terrorism, 35 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 403 (2009); Basia Spalek,
Community Policing, Trust, and Muslim Communities in Relation to “New Terrorism,” 38 POL.
& POL’Y 789 (2010).
154 See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration Enforcement: A
Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 36-43 (2006); Orde F.
Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV.
1449, 1476-90 (2006); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local
Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1381-91 (2006).
155 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. § 2(A) (Ariz. 2010)
156 Id. § 2(B).
157 Id. (emphasis added).
158 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975).
159 Id.; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Kevin R. Johnson, Profiling’s Enabler: High Court Ruling
Underpins Arizona Immigration Law, WASH. POST, July 13, 2010, at A15 (critiquing the
Brignoni-Ponce decision and its consequences).
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amended Senate Bill 1070 to delete the adjective “solely.” 160 As
amended, the law provides that officials may not consider race, color or
national origin “except to the extent permitted by the United States or
Arizona Constitution” 161 —which under Brignoni-Ponce means what the
law said before: that race can be a relevant but not a sole factor. 162 The
amendment gave Arizona some cover, however, in the political and
legal battles ahead. Indeed, the District Court of Arizona apparently
read the revision without taking into account the proviso “except to the
extent permitted by the . . . Constitution” and analyzed the law for
preliminary injunction purposes as if it barred consideration of race,
color or national origin. 163
The Arizona law also has a rather clumsily worded requirement
that “[a]ny person who is arrested shall have the person’s immigration
status determined before the person is released.” 164 Read literally, the
provision means that Arizona officials would be flooding the federal
Law Enforcement Support Center, which processes immigration status
checks, with requests because every arrest would necessitate a query. 165
In later litigation, Arizona’s lawyers tried to rewrite the law through
post-hoc interpretation to mean that only where there is reasonable
suspicion that an arrestee is an alien must there be a check, but the
attempt was rejected. 166
A host of other provisions in the Arizona law are mirror images—
in some instances imperfectly so—of federal immigration crimes in an
attempt to further thrust Arizona into the administration of immigration
law and policy. 167 The state law criminalizes failure to carry alien
registration documents, transporting aliens, inducing aliens to enter
Arizona, and employing illegal aliens, among other acts. 168 Further
thrusting state and local officers into immigration law enforcement, the
law authorizes officers to perform a warrantless arrest on probable cause
to believe that the arrestee “has committed any public offense that
makes the person removable from the United States.” 169 The Act also
goes further than federal law in criminalizing the act of applying for
160 H.B. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. § 3(B) (Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/
FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/hb2162c.htm.
161 Id.
162 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.
163 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 989 (D. Ariz. 2010).
164 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. § 2(B) (Ariz. 2010).
165 703 F. Supp. 2d at 995.
166 Id. at 994-96.
167 For a cogent critique of the mirror-image approach to state and local immigration
criminalization, see Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, Cracked Mirror: SB1070 and Other State
Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law 33-34 (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper
No. 10-25), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1648685.
168 Ariz. S.B. 1070, §§ 3, 5, 7-13.
169 Id. § 6.
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work, soliciting work, or performing work by an undocumented
person. 170
In short, while Hazleton tried to create a hostile environment for
unwanted inflows of Latinos by reaching into the workplace and home
and enabling citizen complainants, Arizona’s law transformed the
police—willingly or not—into the ominous embodiment of unwelcome,
particularly for Latinos, whose race has been deemed relevant to
reasonable suspicion of alienage. 171 Decades ago, the Supreme Court
explained that in enacting a uniform national immigration system,
Congress manifested the purpose of leaving the law-abiding “free from
the possibility of inquisitorial practices and police surveillance . . . .” 172
Arizona’s laws—part of a growing patchwork of state intervention in
immigration policy that threatens to sweep up lawfully present
immigrants and even U.S. citizens 173 —upends both the delicate balance
of police and community trust and the goal of averting the problems of a
patchwork of police surveillance states.
III. THE VIRTUES OF ALTERNATE FRAMES FOR
VINDICATING EQUALITY VALUES
While fears of racialized harms spark the strongest fury regarding
the state and local anti-immigrant laws, the firmer foundation for legal
challenges are the stodgier, less controversy-riddled federalism
doctrines of preemption and, potentially, due process. The Equal
Protection Clause has a very high hurdle for plaintiffs to surmount,
requiring proof of discriminatory intent behind the law 174 or
discrimination in the claimant’s case if discriminatory application is
alleged. 175 Savvy officials socialized in contemporary forms and

170
171

Id. § 5.
Id. § 2(B) (providing that officials may not base reasonable suspicion on race, color or
national origin “except to the extent permitted by the United States or Arizona Constitution”); see
also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975) (stating that Mexican “race”
can be relevant albeit not sole factor in establishing reasonable suspicion).
172 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941).
173 See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995-96 & n.7 (D. Ariz. 2010) (noting
that at least eighteen states are aiming to follow Arizona and that the laws would increase “the
intrusion of police presence into the lives of legally-present aliens (and even United States
citizens), who will necessarily be swept up”).
174 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (requiring, to establish
discriminatory intent, proof that the decisionmaker chose “a particular course of action at least in
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-45 (1976) (requiring proof of “a racially discriminatory
purpose” and holding that showing substantial disproportionate impact alone is insufficient).
175 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 290-98 (1987) (holding that sophisticated
statistical study is insufficient; there must be evidence specific to the claimant’s case).
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conventions of behavior generally no longer provide such blatant
evidence.
Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause’s conscious purpose
standard altogether neglects the problems of implicit bias or racialized
anxieties and angers that are unconscious or not fully acknowledged to
ourselves that nonetheless generate racialized harm. 176 Constitutional
criminal procedure protections also offer no succor for racial harms
because criminal procedure doctrine simply directs claimants to the
strictures and blind spots of equal protection doctrine. 177 Indeed, to the
extent courts have invalidated overreaching state and local laws, the
bases have been preemption 178 and, in two trial courts, due process
doctrines. 179
A.

Preemption and Due Process as Alternate Frames

The Third Circuit’s recent decision in Lozano v. City of Hazleton is
an exemplar of how preemption analysis can be an alternate frame for
vindicating antidiscrimination values. Preemption doctrine stems from
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, providing that “the Laws of
the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” 180 Preemption can be express, when Congress
declares the metes and bounds of preemption, or implied because (1) it
is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, (2) state law
poses an “obstacle” to accomplishing and executing Congress’s
176 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5-7 & nn.10-20 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of
Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987). For an overview of the
findings in social psychology on implicit bias, see, for example, Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of
Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497-1530 (2005).
177 An oft-critiqued exemplar of this approach is Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996),
in which the Court declined to review allegations of racial profiling.
178 See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 07-3531, 2010 WL 3504538, at *33-42 (3d Cir. Sept.
9, 2010); Chamber of Commerce v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 765-67, 769 (10th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 991-1007 (D. Ariz. 2010); Villas at Parkside
Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (Farmers Branch III), 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 851-59 (N.D.
Tex. 2010); Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (Farmers Branch II), 577 F.
Supp. 2d 858, 866-75 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043,
1056-57 (S.D. Cal. 2006). But see Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856,
866-67 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no preemption of state laws criminalizing employment of
undocumented workers), cert. granted sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct.
3498 (2010).
179 Farmers Branch II, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 877-79; Garrett, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1058-59.
180 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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purposes, or (3) Congressional intent to occupy the field can be
inferred. 181 The Lozano court found implied preemption of Hazleton’s
employment provisions because of conflict with the carefully calibrated
balance between immigration law enforcement, antidiscrimination
values, and employer interests that Congress struck in the IRCA. 182
The Lozano court detailed how Congress in enacting IRCA
wrought a compromise that “at every level balances specifically chosen
measures discouraging illegal employment with measures to protect
those who might be adversely affected.” 183 Congress heard numerous
witnesses testify regarding deep concern about the risk of employment
discrimination against Hispanic-Americans and other minorities and
deemed antidiscrimination measures essential. 184 Numerous provisions
of the resulting federal law were calibrated to address the concerns,
including the establishment of an office to handle discrimination
charges 185 and the prescribing of civil penalties for discrimination.186
The Lozano court explained that not only did the Hazleton ordinance
provide employers with fewer procedural protections than IRCA, but it
also coerced the use of E-Verify, which was only a voluntary program
under federal law, because its efficacy in catching unauthorized workers
came at the cost of potential discrimination against foreign-born persons
due to database problems discerning their status. 187
Moreover,
Hazleton’s ordinance upset the balance struck by Congress between
enforcement and antidiscrimination by imposing additional sanctions on
employers for hiring undocumented workers without providing the
antidiscrimination protections afforded by federal law. 188
Regarding the housing provisions, the judges declined to “bury
[their] heads in the sand ostrich-like ignoring the reality” of the
ordinance’s aim—which in essence was to expel people from the
city. 189 The court held that the Hazleton ordinance impermissibly
attempted to prohibit residency based on a “snapshot” of immigration
status without regard to whether a final order of removal had or would
issue. 190 The court invalidated this usurpation of the federal power to
determine the conditions under which people may remain in the
181 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001); United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 107-10 (2000); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,
152-53 (1982).
182 Lozano, 2010 WL 3504538, at *33-42.
183 Id. at *33 (quoting Nat’l Ctr. For Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 913 F.2d 1350, 1366 (9th Cir. 1990)).
184 H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 22-23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5672-73.
185 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c)-(d) (2006).
186 Id. § 1324b(g)(2)(B)(iv)(I)-(III).
187 Lozano, 2010 WL 3504538, at *35-36.
188 Id. at *38.
189 Lozano, 2010 WL 3504538, at *41-42.
190 Id. at *42.
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country. Hazleton, however frustrated and angry over the influx of
Latinos to the city, could not assert a power to expel in the guise of
housing ordinances.
The technique of enfolding antidiscrimination concerns into the
preemption analysis bears an intriguing contrast to what Nelson Tebbe
and Robert Tsai have called “hedging.” 191 This analytical move blurs
the boundaries between the chosen basis of decision and a secondary
rationale. 192 Such an approach may plant the seeds of an alternate
rationale to blossom later, when the transition has been eased with an
approach that has a broader base of support at the time.
In contrast to Lozano’s enfolding of antidiscrimination values into
its preemption analysis, the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Chamber
of Commerce v. Edmondson 193 represents a more hesitant approach.
The Edmondson court affirmed a preliminary injunction against
provisions requiring employers to verify the legal status of independent
contractors and making it an actionable “discriminatory practice” to
discharge a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien while retaining
someone the employer knows or “reasonably should have known, is an
unauthorized alien” unless employers use E-Verify, with its attendant
higher risk of discrimination. 194 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that
exposing employers to suit for back pay, costs, attorneys’ fees,
reinstatement, and cease and desist orders constituted a “sanction” that
IRCA expressly preempted. 195 The requirement that the status of
independent contractors be verified was impliedly preempted, the Tenth
Circuit reasoned, because it upset the careful balance struck in IRCA
that excluded independent contractors from verification requirements. 196
Judge Lucero would have gone further and held that the mandate that
employers use the pilot E-Verify system on pain of ineligibility for state
contracts also upset the carefully calibrated federal scheme balancing
antidiscrimination concerns with enforcement concerns. 197 Because
there was not a majority for Judge Lucero’s position, however, the
preemption analysis largely elided antidiscrimination concerns.
At the other end of the spectrum from the Third Circuit’s exemplar
and the Tenth Circuit’s hesitant middle ground is the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano. 198 The
plaintiffs in that case challenged Arizona’s 2007 Legal Arizona
191 Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 475-78
(2010).
192 Id. at 476.
193 594 F.3d 742 (10th Cir. 2010).
194 Id. at 753-55, 765-67, 769.
195 Id. at 765.
196 Id. at 769.
197 Id. at 768-69.
198 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Trying to advance
Worker’s Act, detailed in Part II.B.1. 199
antidiscrimination norms through preemption analysis, the plaintiffs
argued that the forced use of E-Verify upset the federal balance of
antidiscrimination values with enforcement aims that Congress
established by making E-Verify optional and I-9 verification the
default. 200 The Ninth Circuit gave the argument short shrift, however,
curtly dismissing it in a sentence: “This argument fails because
Congress requires employers to use either E-Verify or I-9, and
appellants have not shown that E-Verify results in any greater
discrimination than I-9.” 201 This cursory dismissal without further
analysis contrasts sharply with the careful analysis the Third Circuit
offered of the discrimination risks and error rates of E-Verify.
In another conflict preemption argument with antidiscrimination
overtones, the plaintiffs argued that the harsher sanctions under the
Arizona law than the monetary sanctions under federal law also upset
the delicate federal balance between antidiscrimination and enforcement
by giving employers strong incentive to discriminate. 202 The panel
dismissed the argument, writing briefly that the argument was
“essentially speculative, as no complaint has yet been filed under the
Act and we have before us no record reflecting the Act’s effect on
employers.” 203
The dismissal overlooks that the incentives to
discriminate operate at the opaque and discretionary front end of the
employment decision and can steer action based on the mere threat
before any prosecution, and potentially unbeknownst to the applicant.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Chicanos Por La
Causa, now captioned Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, offering the
prospect of revision. 204 At oral argument in the case, Justice Breyer
was eloquently attuned to how the Arizona law upset the delicate
balance between antidiscrimination protection and enforcement set by
federal law. He told counsel for Arizona:
The main—the main anomaly it seemed to me to be this, that in the
Federal Act, as—that was the first point that the [petitioner] Chamber
[of Commerce] made, that it's a fairly careful balance. There are a
group of people in Arizona, they may look as if they come from
Mexico or speak with an Hispanic accent, and you are not certain
whether they in fact are illegals or that they are legal. Now, think of
that category.
Congress has passed a statute that gives the employer just as much
incentive to verify, so there is no discrimination, as to dismiss, so
199
200
201
202
203
204

See also id. at 860, 866.
Id.
Id. at 867.
Id.
Id.
Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010).
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there is no illegal hiring. It's absolutely balanced. A $1,000 fine for
the one, a $1,000 fine for the other.
So Arizona comes along and says: I'll tell you what, if you
discriminate, you know what happens to you, nothing? But if you
hire an illegal immigrant, your business is dead. That's just one thing
they do. Now, how can you reconcile that intent to prevent
discrimination against people because of their appearance or
accent—how do you reconcile that with Arizona's law?
If you are a businessman, every incentive under that law is to call
close questions against hiring this person. Under the Federal law
every incentive is to look at it carefully. 205

Justice Breyer was also attuned to the error rate of E-Verify and the
impact of mandatory use on applicants, stating:
And I was worried about the E[-Verify] review which it seemed to
require because it seemed to me in 20 percent of the cases where the
notice is, this guy is not authorized; we don’t have any record that he
is authorized to work—20 percent of those are wrong and he is
authorized to work.
So the employer who follows that is really going to fire 20 percent of
the people who will be absolutely entitled to work. 206

Justice Kennedy also expressed concern over the mandatory use of the
E-Verify system, telling counsel for Arizona:
But you are taking the mechanism that Congress said will be a pilot
program that is optional and you are making it mandatory. It seems
to me that’s almost a classic example of a State doing something that
is inconsistent with a Federal requirement. 207

Justice Sotomayor’s questioning highlighted that the Arizona statute
does not merely impose an additional licensing sanction—it usurps the
federal power to investigate and adjudicate as well. 208 This usurpation
of the investigative and adjudicative power also raises
antidiscrimination concerns relevant to conflict preemption analysis.
Mandatory investigation of anonymous complaints filed pursuant to the
state procedure poses the risk of harassment, fear, and further
surveillance of people of color who may be targeted because of
appearance or language and misperceived to be undocumented persons.
Also pending further review is the District of Arizona’s recent
decision in United States v. Arizona, which preliminarily enjoined the
most controversial aspects of Arizona Senate Bill 1070 on preemption

205 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, No. 09-115
(U.S. Dec. 8, 2010) (Breyer, J.), available at 2010 WL 4974382.
206 Id. at 36.
207 Id. at 38 (Kennedy, J.).
208 Id. at 15, 17 (Sotomayor, J.); see also id. at 53-54 (responding to Justice Sotomayor’s
queries).
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grounds. Antidiscrimination norms did not expressly enter the district
court’s analysis, though the court was quite cognizant of the concerns 209
and they arguably influenced its preemption analysis. Among several
provisions enjoined, 210 the court ruled that the provision mandating
immigration checks of every arrestee’s status was likely preempted
because it conflicted with congressional intent not to subject those
lawfully present to “inquisitorial practices and police surveillance” and
would divert federal resources, including the status-checking Law
Enforcement Support Center, away from federal law enforcement
priorities. 211 As to the controversial provision on immigration status
determination during lawful stops, detentions or arrests, the court
similarly reasoned that the burden of processing status check requests
and the risk of subjecting lawfully present people to “inquisitorial
practices and police surveillance” were grounds for likely conflict
preemption. 212 Situated in the eye of the storm—Arizona—the district
court appeared to take special care to try to couch invalidation of these
controversial provisions in terms of the imperiled interests of all.
Due process doctrines such as the void-for-vagueness principle and
procedural protections before deprivation of a property interest also
present alternate avenues to vindicate equality interests. 213 Thus far,
however, the Due Process Clause is a path less taken in decisions
concerning state and local anti-immigrant laws, with few examples.
The Southern District of California preliminarily enjoined an Escondido
law similar to the Hazleton housing law on both preemption and due
process grounds. The court reasoned that the Due Process Clause was
affronted because no administrative review was afforded to landlords or
tenants of the designation of illegal alien status and order to evict before
the deprivation of the interest in tenancy and subjection of landlords to
penalties. 214 Perhaps wary of due process challenges, Hazleton’s
revision of its Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance subsequently
209 See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 997 n.11 (D. Ariz. 2010) (noting
pending racial profiling claims).
210 The district court also enjoined as likely preempted provisions imposing different penalties
than federal law for failure to carry immigration documents, provisions going further than federal
law in criminalizing the act of working or looking for work by an undocumented person, and
provisions permitting police officers to make warrantless arrests based on probable cause to
believe the person has committed a public offense rendering the person removable. Id. at 9981002, 1004-06.
211 Id. at 993-97.
212 Id. at 996-98.
213 For accounts of how the vagueness doctrine has been used to curb legislative invasion of
constitutional norms and values such as freedom of expression and equality, see, for example,
Tammy W. Sun, Equality by Other Means: The Substantive Foundations of the Vagueness
Doctrine, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (on file with Cardozo Law Review);
Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REV. 67 (1960).
214 Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1058-59 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
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tacked on a new section providing, among other things, procedures for
appeal. 215 The Northern District of Texas held as void for vagueness a
housing ordinance requiring the “owner and/or property manager” to
verify immigration status of tenants by requiring “submission of
evidence of citizenship or eligible immigration status.” 216 The court
found the ordinance unacceptably vague because of the lack of
specificity and uncertainty as to what documents sufficed and what
constituted “eligible immigration status.” 217 While thus far not as
widely used in the anti-“alien” cases, due process doctrines can be
illuminating, alternate frames for vindicating antidiscrimination values;
they underscore the generalized dangers of arbitrary and unchecked
government power.
B.

Making Shared Interests Rather than
Racial Difference Salient

One of the virtues of alternate frames for vindicating
antidiscrimination values is the ability to bridge across disparate
worldviews. Someone with a hierarchical worldview, for example,
might value federalism principles even if the protection of
underprivileged minorities does not have strong appeal. Someone with
an individualistic orientation may find resonant due process concerns
against arbitrary and unchecked government power—whereas the
notion that individual interests should give way to antidiscrimination
and equality interests could be riling.
Alternate frames for
antidiscrimination norms can thus help communicate the import of these
interests to those who are skeptical or downright hostile—and who
therefore may be important forces behind norm-pushing tough
legislation. 218
Alternate frames can also make shared interests, rather than racial
difference and divergence of interests, salient, which helps to ameliorate
inflamed perceptions. We become particularly parochial and polarized
during times of economic and political turmoil, and resort to the politics
of ferocity towards the threatening Other to rally a fearful, fractured,
215 Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40, § 7(F) (Dec. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-PA-0001-0016.pdf.
216 Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (Farmers Branch II), 577 F. Supp. 2d
858, 862, 876-77 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
217 Id.
218 Compare Dan Kahan’s argument that law and policy should be infused with a surfeit of
meanings—an approach he calls “expressive overdetermination”—so that divergent worldviews
can be simultaneously affirmed and people in a pluralistic society can deliberate with rather than
past each other. Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 145-48
(2007).
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and doubting polity. Racial differentiation and divergence of interests
become particularly relevant, and can operate as blinders. Negative
stereotypes can be particularly pronounced. Studies have found that an
“ego threat” to self-regard activates negative ethnic stereotypes and
heightens prejudice against out-groups. 219 Social psychologists have
theorized that part of the function of negative stereotypes is to help
bolster self-regard. 220 It is particularly important in such times for law
to help deactivate the tendency to resort to heightened out-group
vilification and to remind us of common ground and interest
convergence. 221
The Third Circuit’s decision in Lozano accomplished this aim of
artfully reframing equality in a more palatable, less polarizing form. By
ruling that Hazleton disrupted the antidiscrimination-enforcement
balance carefully struck by the national polity, the court rendered
antidiscrimination norms majoritarian. Vindicating antidiscrimination
norms did not entail a countermajoritarian pitting of an out-group’s
interests against the desires of an already-riled polity. Rather,
vindicating antidiscrimination interests focused on vindicating the
shared interest in federal structure, and not allowing a patchwork of
rogue jurisdictions to undermine a carefully crafted national balance.
The District of Arizona, more cautiously, tried to underscore that
Arizona Senate Bill 1070’s most controversial provisions implicated the
interests of citizens as well as aliens.
Why should the palatability of bases for decisions matter to courts,
which, after all, are customarily conceived as set above the political
fray? 222 To be effective and realized in reality, decisions need to be
socially contextualized. For the values implanted by courts to be
realized in practice, they must take root and be accepted by the polity.
219 See, e.g., Steven Fein & Steven J. Spencer, Prejudice as Self-Image Maintenance:
Affirming the Self Through Derogating Others, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 31 (1997).
220 See, e.g., id.; Lennart J. Renkema et al., Terror Management and Stereotyping: Why Do
People Stereotype when Mortality Is Salient?, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 553
(2008).
221 And it is important for scholars to remind us of interest-tying and convergence across
groups. Members of formerly vilified groups that historically bore the brunt of racialized
hostility and accusations of danger and criminality may now be leading the charge against
newcomers. Empathy is sometimes in short supply among those who enjoy the benefits of
changed times and new villains.
222 This customary portrait has long been challenged by political scientists and constitutional
commentators who contend that public demand, political majorities, and elite national opinion
powerfully influence Supreme Court decisionmaking. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 240-41, 250-51 (2004);
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 260-61 (Sanford Levinson ed., 5th
ed. 2010); Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV.
1537, 1538-46 (2004); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as
a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 280-81, 283-89 (1957), reprinted in 50 EMORY L.J.
563, 565-66, 568-575 (2001); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 2596, 2606-08 (2003).
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Part of the art of crafting a judgment is to implant ideas that cultivate
affinity among those who disagree, as Robert Tsai has illuminated in his
work on judicial metaphors and linguistic framing. 223 Reva Siegel and
Robert Post have advised that judges adjudicating some of the most
heated questions in our society must craft their standards carefully,
cognizant of the risk of backlash and resistance that entrench the very
attitudes and legislation that their decisions are trying to ameliorate. 224
The risk of resistance and divergence between pronouncement and
practice is particularly acute on polarizing issues in polarized times.
Commentators have argued in different registers about the value of
grounding equality interventions in shared interests. 225 In the context of
the black struggle for equality, Derrick Bell argued that progress
towards racial equality “will be accommodated only when it converges
with the interests of whites.” 226 He recalled how couching the import of
enforcing school desegregation orders in terms of federalism principles
and respect for the courts’ role of interpreting law had more widespread
appeal. 227 In contrast, racial divergence in interests would undermine
realization of equality protections, despite normative commitments and
claims. 228 Early campaigners for civil rights also apparently recognized
the import of making interest-convergence arguments. For example,
countering the spate of anti-Chinese laws, Dr. J.G. Kerr wrote, “In this
warfare against the Chinese, the rights and liberty of the white man are
just as much at stake as those of the Chinaman. Both must stand or fall
223 ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE & REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT CULTURE 4448 (2008).
224 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470,
1545-46 (2004).
225 E.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 895-96
(2008) (arguing for framing disability accommodations in terms of third-party benefits that are
“more broadly beneficial”); Richard T. Ford, Hopeless Constitutionalism, Hopeful Pragmatism,
in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 143, 151-52 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (“I
suspect that the best—perhaps the only—way to frame a broad constitutional vision that will both
appeal to a majority of Americans and satisfy traditional left-liberal objectives (. . . social esteem
for racial, religious, and sexual minorities; and so on) will be to tell a story that emphasizes what
joins us as a political community.”); Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881,
1937-38 (2000) (explaining the import of shifting discourse on work-related rights from “one that
emphasized work-related rights for some people as members of particular demographic groups
(racial and ethnic minorities, women, the elderly, gays and lesbians, people with disabilities,
welfare mothers, the working poor, and so on) into one that emphasized work-related rights for all
people as members of the broad community of citizens”).
226 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). The proposition, though controversial in its time,
has proved to have powerful explanatory force in an array of contexts. See Cynthia Lee, Cultural
Convergence: Interest Convergence Theory Meets the Cultural Defense, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 911,
922-38 (2007) (analyzing examples).
227 Bell, supra note 226, at 530.
228 Id. at 523, 528.
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together.” 229 While Bell’s theory was positivistic, describing the world
as it is rather than ought to be, there are prescriptive ramifications from
the insight about behavior. As a pragmatic matter, choosing frames that
make interest convergence salient is a way to better secure necessary
majoritarian support for decisions vindicating equality values.
Besides appealing externally to the polity, alternate frames that
make social cohesion and interest convergence salient may also appeal
internally to judicial centrists. In a forthcoming article on the trajectory
of antidiscrimination law, Reva Siegel charts how centrists on the
Supreme Court have adhered to what she terms an antibalkanization
perspective, 230 a third alternative to the anticlassification and
antisubordination views that have cleaved antidiscrimination law. 231 In
her account, the antibalkanization view emerged in cases addressing
governmental attempts to rectify race equality; it is sensitive to the need
to constrain the forms of intervention to promote social cohesiveness
and ameliorate resentment and estrangement. 232
Judicial
decisionmaking is often a group project wherein internal consensus as
well as external consensus must be cultivated. A more palatable
pathway that underscores interest convergence rather than difference
may thus have the double benefit of securing broader judicial as well as
popular support.
The danger of alternate frames is that they may be used to avoid
addressing altogether what is often the biggest concern regarding antiimmigrant laws—the risk of racialized harms. Indeed, particularly in
polarized and fierce times and contexts, there may be a desire to eschew
or elide the vexing and ire-rousing concerns. Who wants to open
Pandora’s Box, or even slightly raise the lid, when times are tough
enough? This approach, however, allows wounds to fester wholly
unaired. It emboldens the angry and anxious to enact intensifying and
multifarious vehicles of venting ire at the expense of out-groups.
Alternate frames are constructive rather than destructive when they take
into account antidiscrimination concerns and address them in ways that
are more palatable across worldviews and less polarizing—not when
they ignore some of the biggest concerns altogether.

229 J.G. KERR, THE CHINESE QUESTION ANALYZED 5 (1877), available at
http://www.oac.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/hb009n96wp/?order=2&brand=oac4.
230 Siegel, supra note 14. Professor Siegel draws, in part, on Justice O’Connor’s opinion for
the Court in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), describing the “lasting harm to our society”
posed by racial classifications. Id. at 657. Racial classifications, Justice O’Connor warned, “may
balkanize us into competing racial factions; [they] threaten[] to carry us further from the goal of a
political system in which race no longer matters . . . .” Id.
231 Siegel, supra note 14 (manuscript at 10-26).
232 Id. (manuscript at 25-26).
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Counteracting Cascades of Misperception

In addressing the legislative products of the politics of
demonization, courts also have an important role to play in
counteracting cascades of misperception that are catalyzed in fierce
friend-enemy politics. A prime example of a social cascade of
misperception was the immigration-crime linkage and arousal of alarm,
despite crime data giving good cause for calm, that helped fuel passage
of Arizona Senate Bill 1070, discussed in Part II.B.2. Courts removed
from the political fray have the luxury of deliberation and reason, and
can use the megaphone of the courts to counteract social cascades of
misperception rather than reinforce them. This calls for an ethic of care
in crafting decisions that bear on the politics of demonization to prevent
amplifying and reproducing a potentially incorrect narrative and
construct.
To take an example, the opening line of Judge Bolton’s decision in
United States v. Arizona seems to echo—and thereby legitimize—the
alarmist narrative behind Arizona Senate Bill 1070. The decision
begins by stating that the law was enacted “[a]gainst a backdrop of
rampant illegal immigration, escalating drug and human trafficking
crimes, and serious public safety concerns.” 233 The way in which a
decision is crafted and framed matters as much as the substance of the
result reached. The opening clause of United States v. Arizona is, from
this perspective, unfortunate because it helps promulgate constructs and
claims that may be more a product of overheated misperception than
reality, based on the data discussed in Part II.B.2. The opening presents
a pronounced contrast to the Third Circuit’s approach of framing
Hazleton’s laws and its stated rationales in terms of the larger context of
racialized anxieties in a time of social change. 234
There is much at stake in defusing and counteracting
misperception. Politics of demonization are dangerous because they
can entrench harmful, racialized misperception, playing on cognitive
weaknesses. As discussed, the ostensibly race-neutral construct of the
“illegal alien” is suffused with racialized perception that “draws on
stereotypes about Mexicans as criminals” 235 and “the iconic illegal
alien.” 236 Alarmist narratives further spread and aggravate the risk of
racialized hostility and harm.

233
234
235
236

United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (D. Ariz. 2010).
See supra text accompanying notes 97-104.
See Johnson, supra note 96, at 171 (discussing stereotypes of Mexicans as criminals).
See NGAI, supra note 96 (tracing the history of how Mexicans emerged as “the iconic
illegal alien”).
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The salient feature of racial distinctiveness in minorities can
contribute to distorted perceptions of correlation with negative traits
such as criminality. 237 This formation of what is called in the social
psychology literature an “illusory correlation” is due to how
distinctiveness and infrequency distort our judgment, leading us to link
racially salient people with salient negative behaviors and to
overestimate the association because both are infrequently encountered
and strikingly salient in their joint infrequency. 238 Illusory correlations
in perception are aggravated by expectancy-based mechanisms and
confirmation biases that render us resistant to data contrary to our
stereotypes and selectively attuned to belief-confirming information,
while we discount or discard information that does not fit the view. 239
We are particularly susceptible to hostile misperception in times of
social strain and national self-doubt—like that precipitated by our
present economic turmoil—because, as social psychologists have
posited, “ego threat” to self-regard activates negative ethnic stereotypes
to bolster self-regard. 240
We cannot sanitize incendiary and conflationary speech without
overrunning our cultural and constitutional commitments to freewheeling debate. But the megaphone of the courts, through the crafting
of decisions, can and should be used to correct and counteract the
spread of conflation and misperception—in addition to curtailing
legislative overreaching. Particularly in times of fierce politics of
anxiety and blame, we must be attuned to the realities and risks of group
stigmatization and potential racialized harm. We must recognize the
import of ameliorating inflamed and distorted politics and perception, as
well as overreaching legislation.
CONCLUSION
History’s repetitions, in different registers and legal forms, teach us
the dangers of overreaching state and local laws used to vent
frustrations on out-groups whose members are either overtly or
implicitly racialized. In such times of fierce politics, the form and mode
of judicial intervention to curb divisive and destructive excesses
matters. We must be attentive to how to manage the inflammation of

237 See Klaus Fiedler, Illusory Correlations: A Simple Associative Algorithm Provides a
Convergent Account of Seemingly Divergent Paradigms, 4 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 25, 34 (2000)
(reviewing literature).
238 Id. at 32, 34.
239 See STANLEY WOLL, EVERYDAY THINKING: MEMORY, REASONING AND JUDGMENT IN
THE REAL WORLD 379-80 (2002) (reviewing literature).
240 See supra text accompanying notes 219-20.
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feeling that gives rise to the surge of problematic laws. Unityreinforcing frames of analysis such as preemption doctrine can be
deployed in a manner that renders salient, in a more palatable fashion,
previous national commitments to antidiscrimination values. This helps
foster the polarization-amelioration and cooperation necessary to curb
the excesses and inflamed perceptions of the times.

